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Specialization and delegation of policy leadership within committees is the norm rather than 
the exception in legislatures around the world. Yet, little research has studied the sub-groups 
of lawmakers who serve as policy-leaders on particular bills. This paper uses conceptual and 
methodological tools from social network analysis to investigate the groups’ composition and 
relational structure. It tests the proposition that limited human resources lead lawmakers from 
small parties to more frequently engage with a greater number of colleagues from other 
parties across a wider range of policy areas. This may have important relational benefits that 
have the potential to outweigh the structural disadvantages of small party size. We examine 
whether small party lawmakers participate more, are more central, and have greater potential 
for brokerage in policymaking networks, or if the constraints associated with small party size 
and/or particular ideological leanings prevent their realization. Empirically, our analyses 
focus on working relationships between rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs in the adoption 
of reports by standing committees of the 7
th
 European Parliament (2009-2014). 
Methodologically, we employ a mixed methods approach. Our quantitative analyses show 
that small party size does not affect legislators’ participation in policymaking networks, but 
that it increases legislators’ centrality and brokerage potential. Regarding ideology, being 
committed to democratic participation as a good in itself has a positive association with all 
three outcomes, while attitudes to European integration show no effect. Our qualitative data 
suggest that the relational benefits of belonging to a small party partially mitigate the 
structural disadvantages associated with it. They also indicate that policymaking in the 
European Parliament is quite inclusive, as any systematic exclusion tends to be the result of 
self-marginalisation.  
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The organization of legislatures is characterized by specialization and the internal division of 
labor. Indeed, most parliaments and assemblies have developed an elaborate system of 
committees, which are the locus for the detailed policy work in the legislature and are 
generally acknowledged to be important arenas of power and influence (Mattson and Strøm 
2004). Given their near-universal prevalence, research on the composition, role, and policy 
influence of committees has a long and rich tradition in political science (Martin 2014). 
However, legislative specialization and the division of labor do not stop at this level. Within 
committees, the deliberation and negotiation of particular policy proposals tend to be 
dominated by sub-groups of policy “entrepreneurs” (Benedetto 2005) who dedicate time, 
energy, and resources to guiding “their” legislation through the policymaking process. Yet, 
the processes through which committee members are selected into these sub-groups are 
usually informal and often opaque; and the groups’ elusive nature makes it hard to identify 
their membership and systematically investigate their members’ interaction. Hence, little 
research exists that has examined these sub-groups of policy-makers, even though 
specialization and delegation of policy leadership within committees is the norm rather than 
the exception in legislatures around the world. 
In this paper, we examine policymaking sub-groups in legislative committees using 
methodological and conceptual tools from social network analysis. This approach not only 
allows us to shed light on the composition of these groups and how their members are 
connected, but also to empirically test the main theoretical question we pose: does small party 
size, which tends to constrain the effectiveness and influence of legislators, have relational 
benefits that their members are able to realize in legislative policymaking networks? While 
small parties and their members tend to be structurally and practically disadvantaged in 
legislative politics, limited human resources may lead lawmakers from small parties to more 
frequently engage with a greater number of colleagues from other parties across a wider 
range of policy areas than their large party colleagues. Such engagement may entail the 
establishment and maintenance of strong social network ties that connect co-legislators who 
are not themselves connected in policymaking networks, which may lead to greater 
interpersonal trust (Uzzi 1996), greater access to substantive and political information (Levin 
and Cross 2004), and the potential for brokerage (Burt 1992). We examine if policymaking 
networks in committee constitute opportunity structures for small party legislators to reap 
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these relational benefits, or if the constraints associated with small party size and/or particular 
ideological leanings prevent their realization. 
Our empirical tests rely on data from the European Parliament (EP), a particularly 
instructive case for examining policymaking teams, for two reasons. First, groups of key 
policymakers for particular legislation are clearly identifiable as rapporteurs and shadow 
rapporteurs (hereafter “shadows”). Rapporteurs are the members of the EP (MEPs) in charge 
of drafting the official committee report on a particular legislative proposal and guiding it 
through the lawmaking process. Shadows are assigned by those party groups who do not hold 
the rapporteurship as their lead negotiators; they monitor and work alongside the rapporteur. 
Together, rapporteurs and shadows form “negotiating teams“ (Hurka et al. 2015) that can 
“practically constitute informal sub-committees” (Corbett et al. 2011: 159), both inside the 
EP and in the EP’s negotiations with the Council of Ministers. Previous research recognizes 
the importance of these individuals (e.g., Kaeding 2004; Mamadouh and Raunio 2003; 
Yoshinaka et al. 2010), but has not paid attention to them as groups of policymakers who 
jointly guide legislative proposals through the lawmaking process. The second reason for 
focusing on the EP is that the rules governing participation in EP policymaking are highly 
permissive: any party group may assign a shadow to any legislative proposals under 
consideration. This allows us to examine how constraints associated with party size and/or 
ideology impact legislators’ membership and structural positions in policymaking networks.  
Rapporteurs and shadows are the nodes in the policymaking networks we examine and 
are linked to each other by their joint work on particular legislative proposals. To analyse 
these networks, we employ a mixed-methods approach. First, we use social network analysis 
to identify who is part of the policymaking networks in each of the EP’s 20 standing 
committees during its 7
th
 term (2009-2014) and to investigate members’ structural positions 
in those networks, namely their centrality and potential for brokerage. Second, we use 
statistical methods to examine associations between network membership and positions and a 
number of potential explanatory variables, in particular party group size and MEPs’ ideology. 
Party group size allows us to capture the ability of individual legislators to participate in 
policymaking and reap the potential benefits of strong, bridging network ties. Countervailing 
forces might be constraints imposed by limited time, expertise, and other resources associated 
with smaller party group size. Ideology allows us to get at the willingness of MEPs to engage 
in policymaking networks and assume structurally advantageous network positions in them, 
which may be affected by their views on the EU and the European integration process and 
their commitment (or lack thereof) to participation in democratic decision-making. Finally, to 
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gain a better understanding of the causal mechanisms underlying our quantitative results, but 
also to gauge the possible effects of network position on the effectiveness and policy 
influence of MEPs, we complement these analyses with the qualitative analysis of data from 
a series of in-depth, semi-structured interviews with respondents in the EP. 
We find that MEPs from small party groups are not more likely than their large-party 
colleagues to be members of policymaking networks, but that they are both more central and 
have greater potential for brokerage. These relational benefits, our interviews suggest, may 
somewhat mitigate the structural disadvantages associated with being a small party group, but 
they do not fully outweigh them. We also find that members of parties with a greater 
commitment to democratic participation as a good in itself are both more likely to be part of 
policymaking networks and have greater centrality and potential for brokerage. In contrast, 
pro-EU attitudes are not associated with these outcomes. Overall, we find EP policymaking is 
quite inclusive, in particular because our interviews suggest that systematic exclusion tends to 
be the result of self-marginalization. 
Aside from shedding light on the composition of sub-groups of committee members 
who serve as policy leaders with regard to particular legislative proposals, and on the 
potential relational benefits of small party size, our results also have important normative 
implications. After all, specialization and delegation in committees have the potential to 
impact the democratic legitimacy of legislative decision-making. These implications concern, 
first, its “input legitimacy,” which relates to appropriate levels of representation of the people 
(Scharpf 1999), since citizens are only able to express and pursue their demands through their 
elected representatives if those representatives actively partake in the policymaking process. 
But social network analysis also allows us to identify the structural positions of lawmakers in 
policymaking networks, which affects their potential to shape decision-making processes and 
outcomes. As such, it relates to the “throughput legitimacy” of the democratic process 
(Schmidt 2013), which concerns the “black box of governance” that links input legitimacy 
and output legitimacy. In particular, we are able to gauge the role of small party MEPs in 
policymaking networks and the extent to which they are able and willing to realize the 
relational benefits that may come with small party size. This allows us to better evaluate the 
relative (dis-)advantages confronted by representatives of citizens who cast their votes for 
small parties and/or those with particular ideological profiles. 
The paper proceeds as follows: we briefly review the roles of rapporteurs and shadows 
before discussing the structural disadvantages and potential relational benefits of small party 
size. We then develop theoretical arguments and hypotheses about the effects of party group 
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size and ideology on committee members’ network membership and position, which we test 
in a series of analyses. The final section concludes. 
Rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs 
Rapporteurs are responsible for drafting the EP’s official reports on the legislative proposals 
that originate in the European Commission, and for shepherding the proposed legislation 
through the lawmaking process. This involves policy leadership both inside the EP and in 
inter-institutional negotiations with the Council of Ministers – especially under the ‘ordinary 
legislative procedure,’ when the two institutions have to agree on an identical final text. 
Rapporteurs are selected in a kind of “auction,” where party groups in the responsible EP 
committee bid on reports using “points” they receive according to the proportion of seats they 
hold. Only one group can win the rapporteurship on a given report, which potentially 
provides it with a disproportionate influence on the legislation. The other party groups may 
therefore assign one shadow each to monitor the rapporteur’s work, “to follow the progress of 
the relevant report and [to] find compromises within the committee on behalf of the group” 
(EP Rules of Procedure VIII 205.4). 
While rapporteurs have received a considerable amount of scholarly attention, the role 
of shadows is less well understood, with some exceptions (Corbett et al. 2011; Judge and 
Earnshaw 2011; Settembri and Neuhold 2009). Ringe (2010), for example, identifies them as 
the primary negotiation partners of the rapporteur within the committee, as well as the 
primary sources of information for their party colleagues and shows that the final decisions in 
the EP concerning particular policy proposals are significantly shaped by rapporteurs and 
shadows. In the absence of perfect information about the content and consequences of 
proposed legislation, other MEPs tend to follow the lead of their colleagues in the responsible 
standing committee when voting on the EP floor, especially their party groups’ rapporteur or 
shadow (Ringe 2010). Teams of rapporteurs and shadows thus have the potential to 
disproportionately influence the content of legislation and the decision-making of the 
chamber as a whole (Costello and Thomson 2011; Reh et al. 2013; Settembri and Neuhold 
2009). 
Until recently, information on shadow rapporteurships was not made available in any 
systematic fashion, meaning that their function and influence in EP politics was generally 
highlighted in qualitative accounts of EP policymaking. Only with the onset of the EP’s 7
th
 
term in 2009 did the EP website start listing shadows for each legislative dossier, and these 
quantitative data have not yet been used extensively. The notable exception is a recent article 
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by Hurka, Kaeding, and Obholzer (2015), which examines the extent to which MEPs from 
the countries that joined the EU in and after 2004 are under-represented as shadows.  
While the assignment of rapporteurships follows clear procedures and has been the 
subject of previous work, little is known about the more informal procedure of selecting 
shadows. A key contribution of our mixed methods approach is that our qualitative data allow 
us to investigate this process. Our interviews (which are discussed in more detail below) 
show that the allocation of shadow rapporteurships is remarkably bottom-up. Every one of 
our respondents explained, independently of the others and consistently across party groups 
and committees, that party group members in the responsible committee indicate which 
reports they are interested in covering and receive those reports whenever no other party 
group colleague wants them. If more than one MEP claims a report for himself or herself, a 
final determination is made by the committee coordinator (the leader and main spokesperson 
of his or her party group in a given committee). This decision takes into account who is 
already in charge of other reports (Interviews #6, 8, 10, 11); substantive expertise and 
competence (#3, 6, 8, 10, 11); the level of activity and engagement an MEP has demonstrated 
over time (#2, 3, 11); and the geographic and national makeup of the negotiating team as a 
whole (#4, 6, 11). Moreover, the selection of the shadow may, at least at times, be a reaction 
to who has been picked as rapporteur, since political groups want to “match” a strong 
rapporteur with a similarly strong shadow (#6). These criteria are not formal rules but 
conventions that reflect best practices and are at least in part subject to the committee 
coordinators’ ways of running their political groups’ affairs in the relevant committee (#2, 3, 
7, 8, 9, 10). In general, however, respondents agree with the conclusion of one MEP who 
describes the process as generally collaborative and “collegial” (#4). 
The relational power of small numbers 
Small parties and their members face numerous disadvantages in legislative politics 
compared to parties with large numbers of members. They have lower voting weight and 
coalition potential, fewer human and financial resources, and their members hold fewer (if 
any) leadership positions. Even in the EP, a legislature with strong rules of proportionality 
that favour small parties relative to more majoritarian institutions, the two largest party 
groups only held a combined 55% of seats after the 2014 election, but 65% of members of the 
EP Bureau, 68% of committee chairs, and 64% of committee vice-chairs were from those two 
party groups. Similarly, 66% of rapporteurships during the 2009-14 term were awarded to the 
two largest parties, who only won a combined 61% of seats in 2009. 
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Moreover, even when a member of a small party is awarded a leadership post, s/he is 
unlikely to wield as much influence a member of a large party would. For example, the small 
party chairman of a legislative committee or a small party rapporteur are less powerful than a 
large party legislator would be in those positions, because their influence is constrained by 
having few party colleagues in committee as natural allies. The formal disadvantages of being 
small and the advantages of being big are thus amplified in practice. Indeed, it is difficult to 
conceive of a way in which being from a small party offers advantages for legislators’ ability 
to participate in and influence policymaking processes and outcomes. A social networks 
perspective, however, suggests that being small may yield relational benefits that have the 
potential to (at least partially) counteract the structural disadvantages that come with small 
party size.  
The study of legislative networks has a long tradition (e.g., Patterson 1959; Routt 1938) 
and studying social ties between lawmakers helps us better understand legislative behaviour, 
processes, and outcomes (e.g., Arnold et al. 2000; Cho and Fowler 2010; Cohen and Malloy 
2014; Parigi and Bergemann 2016; Ringe et al. 2013). A social networks perspective of 
legislative politics suggests that there may be such a thing as a “strength of small numbers,” 
because, ceteris paribus, large parties spread their more abundant human resources across 
legislative proposals, while parties with fewer members are forced to cover those same 
proposals with a smaller number of people. In other words, large parties assign people fewer 
proposals each, while small parties assign them a larger number of proposals each. As a 
result, members of parties with fewer members are forced to more frequently engage with a 
greater number of colleagues from other parties across a wider range of policy issues, which 
leads to the establishment and maintenance of strong social network ties that connect co-
legislators that are otherwise not connected to one another.
1
 This has important potential 
benefits emphasized in previous social networks research, which shows power to be not only 
a function of size (and the resources and status that come with it) but also of actors’ social 
ties and the structural positions in the social networks they are part of (e.g. Bonacich 1987; 
Fowler 2006; Friedkin 1991; Ringe and Wilson 2016).  
Among the “strength of strong ties” (Krackhardt 1992) is that more frequent, iterative 
interactions facilitate the establishment of trust (Uzzi 1996), which lowers the potential for 
conflict and gives those engaged in legislative bargaining confidence that their counterparts 
will honour a deal. Hence, strong ties facilitate agreement, which is further aided by the 
possibility of issue linkage and horse-trading across policy proposals, where lawmakers who 
interact with each other on more than one legislative proposal may be able to forge 
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agreements by making trade-offs across bills. Trust also encourages both the provision and 
absorption of useful and truthful information and makes knowledge transfer less costly, for 
example by reducing the need to verify information (see Levin and Cross 2004: 1478).
2
 
Engagement with a greater number and range of policy proposals also makes it more 
likely that members of small parties connect other legislators who are not otherwise tied to 
one another, because small party lawmakers who handle multiple legislative proposals on 
behalf of their parties are likely to interact with colleagues who do not themselves work 
together directly on a bill. As a result, small party legislators may have access to information 
that other lawmakers who are more isolated in the network do not, in terms of both “political 
intelligence” (for example about the positions of key decision makers or potential policy 
coalitions) and substantive information about the content and expected consequences of 
legislation. This may facilitate agenda setting efforts, and they may have greater control over 
the flow of information through the network and thus serve as brokers in the communication 
between others (Burt 1992). 
At this point, a conceptual and methodological caveat is in order. Investigating 
policymaking networks and actors’ structural positions in those networks quantitatively 
means identifying opportunity structures for legislators’ influence; it allows for the 
measurement of potential influence, not actually exerted influence. However, the analysis of 
additional qualitative evidence from interviews with practitioners allows us to get a better 
idea of how these advantageous network positions come about and to what extent they matter 
for policymaking processes and outcomes. While qualitative evidence does not allow us to 
put a precise absolute figure on the benefits derived from advantageous network positions, 
the interview responses highlight the types of advantages incurred and the trade-offs 
involved. 
Small parties MEPs enjoy the relational benefits outlined above relative to their large 
party counterparts in theory and all else equal. Indeed, the potential relational benefits of 
small party size may not be realized because members of small parties may not be able or 
willing to maintain strong, bridging ties. Members of small parties may not be able to engage 
in legislative networks because their parties face resource constraints that are too severe to 
overcome, are hindered or prevented from participating by institutional rules, or are 
marginalized by large parties. They may not be willing for a variety of personal reasons, 
including their ideological profiles, where MEPs with particular ideological leanings may be 
less motivated to participate in policymaking.  
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Our quantitative analyses allow us to assess whether and to what extent party group 
size and aspects of MEPs’ ideology affect their inclination to participate in policymaking. 
This sets our research design apart from previous research, which neglects the role of 
ideology and recognizes party group size as a determinant of the allocation of rapporteurships 
only implicitly. For example, Hurka et al. (2015), Kaeding (2004), and Yoshinaka et al. 
(2010) include dummy variables to control for membership in a particular party group, but 
they do not elaborate on the theoretical rationale for their inclusion nor discuss the 
interpretation of estimated effects of these variables in much detail. To investigate if the 
potential relational benefits of being a small party MEP are realized in EP policymaking 
networks, we look at membership patterns and the structural positions of MEPs in rapporteur-
shadow networks. For structural network positions, we consider two closely related 
individual-level attributes that are important indicators of people’s relational power. The first 
is their network centrality, which (broadly conceived) captures the “importance” of network 
members and is largely a function of the number and strength of their network ties (see 
Wasserman and Faust 1994, chapter 5). The second attribute is their potential for brokerage – 
or the ability to serve as conduits of information and mediators between others –, which is a 
function of the extent to which they connect other members of the network (see Burt 1992). It 
follows from the preceding discussion of the relational “strength of small numbers” that: 
H1a: MEPs from smaller party groups are more likely to be part of policymaking networks 
than MEPs from larger party groups. 
H1b: MEPs from smaller party groups are more central in policymaking networks and have 
greater potential for brokerage than MEPs from larger party groups. 
These propositions do not hold trivially and warrant empirical investigation because both 
structural constraints associated with small party size and ideology may have no or the 
opposite effect on lawmakers’ actual participation in policymaking.
3
  
With regard to ideology, the obvious starting point is previous research that describes 
the EP’s ideological space as two-dimensional, with the classic left-right divide as the 
dominant dimension and a secondary dimension that “captures government-opposition 
conflicts as well as national and European party positions on European integration” (Hix et 
al. 2006: 494). However, looking beyond the institutional confines of the EP, Marks et al. 
(2006: 157) argue that a “noneconomic or cultural, new-politics dimension” has increasingly 
been structuring competition among political parties in Europe, which they describe in 
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reference to the dimension’s opposite poles: green/alternative/libertarian (Gal) versus 
traditionalism/authority/nationalism (Tan). With regard to politics at the EU level, this 
Gal/Tan dimension engages “lifestyle, gender, environment, participatory decision-making, 
and national culture;” strikingly, the authors find that “the Gal/Tan divide is considerably 
more powerful than Left/Right in predicting party positioning across most policy areas" 
(Marks et al. 2006). 
The key question with regard to the impact of ideology is whether particular ideological 
leanings impact legislators’ motivation to participate in policymaking. With regard to the 
Left/Right scale, however, there is no obvious theoretical reason to expect that legislators’ 
general ideological views on a Left/Right scale are causally related to their inclusion or their 
structural positions in EP policymaking networks. It is, simply put, not clear why we would 
expect a lawmaker from the political right to be more or less inclined to actively participate in 
policymaking than a leftist, or vice versa. And indeed, a set of analyses (reported in the 
online appendix) supports this proposition: any impact of left-right ideology is washed out by 
the inclusion of a Gal/Tan indicator.
4
 We thus focus our attention on the expected 
relationships between lawmakers’ positions on the pro-/anti-EU and Gal/Tan dimensions and 
their membership and structural positions in EP policymaking networks. Concerning the 
former, we expect to find a positive relationship between pro-EU sentiment and legislators’ 
inclusion, centrality, and potential for brokerage in policymaking networks. The logic behind 
these hypotheses is that those who are broadly in favour of the European integration process 
should be more likely to seek to influence policymaking processes at the EU level than 
Eurosceptics, who question or reject the desirability of EU law-making. 
H2a: MEPs from national parties that are more pro-EU are more likely to be part of 
policymaking networks than MEPs from national parties that are more anti-EU. 
H2b: MEPs from national parties that are more pro-EU are more central in EP policymaking 
networks and have greater potential for brokerage than MEPs from national parties that are 
more anti-EU. 
With regard to the Gal/Tan dimension, it is of particular interest that Gal positions involve 
support for ‘greater democratic participation’ (Bakker et al. 2015). We hypothesize that, 
because MEPs on the Gal side of the spectrum support democratic participation as a value in 
and of itself, they ought to be more inclined to participate in collective policymaking 
processes, in general and specifically at the EU level. Hence: 
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H3a: MEPs from national parties that are more Gal are more likely to be part of 
policymaking networks than MEPs from national parties that are more Tan. 
H3b: MEPs from national parties that are more Gal are more central in EP policymaking 
networks and have a greater potential for brokerage than MEPs from national parties that 
are more Tan. 
Data and methods 
In the empirical analysis, we examine rapporteurship networks of standing committees in the 
7
th
 EP (2009-14). We collected information about rapporteurships and shadow 
rapporteurships for reports and opinions from MEPs’ official EP webpages, along with 
information about committee and party group membership.
5
 In total, we collected 
information about the involvement of all 857 MEPs in the drafting of a total of 4021 reports 
and opinions. In line with our theoretical focus on substantive policymaking activities, we 
dropped 797 reports and opinions formulated in budgetary, discharge, interinstitutional 
agreement, Parliament’s rules of procedure, or members’ immunity procedures. Furthermore, 
we are not considering five reports drafted by temporary committees.
6
  
 The focus of this study is on drafting policy documents in committees. Thus, separate 
networks are constructed for each standing committee. Since we are aggregating 
policymaking ties over the entire legislative term, any MEP who was a full or substitute 
member at any time a report or opinion was adopted is counted as a committee member and 
can potentially form part of the network.
7
 For our sample of reports and opinions, 847 of the 
857 MEPs met this criterion. Furthermore, since MEPs can be full and substitute members of 
more than one committee, they can also form part of more than one network. As a result, the 
analysis is based on 2246 MEP-by-committee observations.
8
 For each committee, we first 
construct a so-called two-mode network, consisting of two different types of nodes and ties 
that can only link nodes of different types. In our case, MEPs and reports are the two 
different types of nodes, and rapporteurships are the ties or edges connecting these nodes. In 
our study, we are not interested in properties of individual reports. For our purposes, reports 
provide opportunities for interactive relationships that link rapporteurs and shadow 
rapporteurs. Thus, we collapse the two-mode networks of reports and MEPs into one-mode 
networks that indicate these working relationships between MEPs. While this transformation 
results in the loss of information about the identity of individual reports, information on the 
number of reports worked on together by MEPs enters the network in the form of weighted 
edges, where more reports indicate a stronger connection. 
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What is notable and unusual about these data is that they capture actual working 
relationships between legislators: rapporteurs and shadows meet collectively and regularly to 
deliberate and negotiate the legislation they are jointly charged with advancing through the 
legislative process. This interaction may not always mean working cooperatively or 
harmoniously, but it produces genuine social ties between small groups of lawmakers. While 
some previous research has relied on such actual working relationships to map legislative 
networks – for example, Desmarais et al. (Desmarais et al. 2015) treat participation in joint 
press events held by U.S. Senators as social ties, while Ringe et al. (2013) used a survey and 
interviews to record social ties in the EP – being able to do so is generally quite difficult. 
Indeed, a key challenge in all social network analysis is the difficulty of measuring social ties 
directly, which is why researchers routinely rely on proxies for interpersonal relationships, 
such as shared membership in legislative institutions (e.g. Arnold et al. 2000; Ringe and 
Victor 2013), spatial proximity (Masket 2008; Rogowski and Sinclair 2012), alumni 
networks (Cohen and Malloy 2014), shared campaign contributions (Victor and Koger 2016), 
and especially cosponsorship (e.g., Briatte 2016; Fowler 2006; Kirkland 2011). Hence, one of 
the general contributions of this article lies in the use of data that directly captures actual 
social ties between lawmakers. 
The empirical analysis follows a two-step process. First, we are interested in why some 
committee members form part of the policymaking network and others do not. To measure 
network membership, we use a binary variable coded as 1 if a committee member was 
connected to at least one other committee member in the weighted one-mode network and 
coded as 0 otherwise. Network membership is the result of a selection process, and this initial 
analysis investigates what factors influence MEPs’ selection into policymaking networks in 
the first place. Second, for those committee members that form part of the networks, we are 
interested in the determinants of members’ centrality and potential for brokerage in the 
networks. We employ three measures of MEPs’ structural positions in the networks: 
eigenvector centrality, betweenness centrality, and network constraint. All of the measures 
are computed based on the weighted one-mode network. 
Eigenvector centrality is based on the idea that central nodes are those that are strongly 
connected to many other strongly connected nodes (Bonacich 1972). In our context, 
eigenvector centrality measures the level of embeddedness of a committee member in each 
policymaking network as a whole. Committee members with high eigenvector centrality 
scores are involved in writing many reports together with a large number of other committee 
members, who themselves write many reports with many other committee members, and so 
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on. Betweenness centrality measures the relative number of times a node lies on the shortest 
paths connecting other nodes (Freeman 1977) in the network. It thus conceives of the 
“importance” of a node in terms of its ability to transmit (substantive and/or strategic) 
information, which relates to its potential to act as a “bridge” or “broker” between others. 
Yet, it focuses on the shortest paths between any two nodes, which means that information 
can potentially travel through some more distant paths circumventing that particular node.  
We therefore also look at another measure to capture members’ potential for brokerage, 
network constraint, which describes the extent to which a person’s network is concentrated in 
redundant contacts (Burt 1992, chapter 2), such that a lower network constraint score 
indicates that an actor connects more people who are not otherwise tied to each other. 
Whereas Eigenvector and betweenness centrality are global measures that take information 
into account from the entire network, network constraint is a local measure that is calculated 
based only on information from a node’s direct ties to other nodes and the interconnections 
amongst those (Valente and Fujimoto 2010).  
The main independent variables in our study are EP party group membership variables 
and variables measuring attributes of these groups. The party group membership variable is a 





 Once we have established differences in network inclusion, centrality, and 
potential for brokerage across party groups, we investigate the reasons for these differences 
through a number of variables measuring the attributes of party groups and their members.  
Importantly, differences in network inclusion and position might be a result of 
differences in party group size (H1a and H1b). In the analysis of network membership, we 
measure party group size by counting the number of committee members that were affiliated 
with a particular party group. In the analysis of network positions, we count the number of 
party group members that form part of the network. This approach is consistent with our 
assumption that the network generation process can be split into two separate phases: the first 
phase determines whether or not an MEP takes part in the policymaking network at all, and 
the second phase determines the centrality and potential for brokerage of those MEPs who 
take part in the network. In the latter phase, the relevant reference group for determining the 
network position of an MEP is not the party group delegation in the committee as whole, but 
the members of the party group that form part of the network. In either case, the party group 
size variable varies across committees for the same party group. As we expect the effect of 
differences in party group size to wear off with increasing size (e.g., an additional member is 
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more likely to matter for a party group of size 3 than a party group of size 50), we log-
transform the variables for the analyses. 
Our remaining hypotheses relate to MEPs’ ideology. For measures of ideology and 
policy positions, we rely on the 2010 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (Bakker et al. 
2015). Measures based on roll call votes have the advantage of providing position estimates 
for each individual MEP. However, voting occurs at the end of the policymaking process and 
is thus endogenous to our dependent variables. Furthermore, roll call vote analyses are only 
able to identify broad and basic patterns underlying voting in the EP, usually a general left-
right and a pro-/anti-European integration dimension. Relying on the CHES expert survey 
estimates allows us to consider the relevance of more specific policy positions as well, like 
those on the Gal/Tan dimension. Finally, it is important to note that the CHES provides party 
position estimates for national parties, not entire European party groups. Given the small size 
of many national party delegations in the EP, the position measures still provide a 
considerable amount of variation within European party groups. At the same time, they are 
almost guaranteed to be exogenous to MEP behaviour in the 7
th
 EP term. The data for the 
survey was collected in Spring 2011, less than half-way through the 7
th
 term, and it is 
unlikely that the national experts who were asked to evaluate the positions of national parties 
based their estimates on the behaviour of MEPs.    
To estimate a party’s support for European integration, experts were asked: ‘How 
would you describe the general position on European integration that the party leadership 
took over the course of 2010?’ Answers were recorded on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 
‘strongly opposes’ to 7 ‘strongly favours’. To estimate positions on the Gal/Tan dimension, 
they were asked: ’Parties can be classified in terms of their views on democratic freedoms 
and rights. ‘‘Libertarian’’ or ‘‘postmaterialist’’ parties favour expanded personal freedoms, 
for example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic 
participation. ‘‘Traditional’’ or ‘‘authoritarian’’ parties often reject these ideas; they value 
order, tradition, and stability, and believe that the government should be a firm moral 
authority on social and cultural issues.’ Answers to this question were recorded on an 11-
point scale ranging from 0 (libertarian/postmaterialist) to 5 (centre) to 10 
(traditional/authoritarian). 
In order to gain deeper insights into the practical selection of shadows, as well as the 
mechanisms underlying the generation of the observed networks and the associations 
connecting network positions to exogenous party variables, we complement our quantitative 
analysis with qualitative data from ten in-depth, semi-structured interviews. We also 
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exchanged several emails with one MEP who was not available to meet in person. Despite 
this relatively small number of interviews, our sample includes respondents from seven (of 
eight) political groups and ten member states who have been or are involved with ten (and 
thus half) of the EP’s standing committees. Among our respondents were MEPs, MEP 
legislative assistants, party group advisors, and members of the EP secretariat. The responses 
we received were highly consistent across interviews, in particular with regard to the key 
question we sought answers to – on the selection process of shadows, the marginalization of 
the Eurosceptic far right, and the (dis-)advantages of being a small party group. This suggests 
that our qualitative data do not suffer from any apparent selection bias. 
The interviews also helped us to gauge the quality of our quantitative data and expose 
potential limitations. In this regard, two of our interview respondents suggested that shadow 
rapporteurships may be underreported for the European People’s Party (EPP) and the 
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D). They claimed that the two largest 
party groups always provide a shadow, which is not borne out by our data. We thus have to 
first determine if any potential underreporting can be treated as random measurement error or 
if it may bias our results. In a first step, we considered how many of those instances where no 
shadow was reported for the EPP (19% of all observations) and S&D (24%) involve 
legislative files where no shadows are reported for any party group. We found that only 5.2% 
and 8.7% of observations relate to reports where a shadow is reported for at least one other 
party group but not for EPP or S&D, respectively. In other words, most instances of possible 
underreporting of shadow rapporteurships for EPP and S&D involve legislative files where 
no shadows are reported at all. This suggests that the main problem with the data, if there is 
one, would be one of general underreporting across the board. Therefore, our descriptive 
results concerning the relative involvement of different party groups in policymaking 
networks and the results of our regression analyses are unlikely to be biased.
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Second, we systematically compared our shadow rapporteurship data, which is 
collected from the biographical webpages of each MEP on the EP website, to shadow 
rapporteurships reported in the EP’s Legislative Observatory. There are small discrepancies 
between the two data sources (3.5% of all observations in the combined dataset),
11
 which at 
first glance may seem problematic. However, the discrepancies are of the size that we would 
expect from random measurement error; and the fact that there are small discrepancies 
between the two data sources shows that they are not functionally linked. At the same time, 
they provide overwhelmingly consistent information. It is unlikely that two independent 
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Effect of party group membership on network membership 
Figure 1 shows the overall network membership rate for different party groups across all 
committees, with party groups on the x-axes ordered according to their ideological positions 
on the left-right dimension. The three smaller groups of the centre and the left – Alliance of 
Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA), 
and European United Left - Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) – are the most strongly involved 
party groups. The two largest groups, the centre-left S&D and, even more so, the centre-right 
EPP, are considerably less involved. The moderately Eurosceptic European Conservatives 
and Reformist (ECR) have similar membership rates as the two largest groups. Finally, the 
far-right Eurosceptic EFD group has by far the lowest network membership rate of any 






Figure 1. Network membership by party group 
Notes: Bars indicate the percentage of party group members included in a network, based on pooled data 
including all MEP-by-committee observations. The dashed horizontal line indicates the mean membership 
percentage across members of all party groups. N = 2246. 
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To systematically investigate differences across party groups and the possible reasons for 
these differences, we conduct a number of logistic regression analyses. The dependent 
variable in these regressions is a dummy variable indicating whether or not a committee 
member is part of the committee’s policymaking network. All regressions include committee 
dummies to account for committee specific differences that affect the baseline probability of 
being part of the network, especially committee membership size and the “supply” of reports. 
For reasons of space, the coefficients for these dummy variables are not reported. As a 
comparison of the committee-specific membership rates show (indicated by dashed 
horizontal lines in the panels of Figure A9 in the online appendix), this baseline probability 
varies considerably from committee to committee. Model 1 in Table 1 presents the regression 
coefficients for the categorical party group membership variable. To aid the interpretation of 
the party group membership effects, Models 2 to 3 report the results of bivariate regressions 
using party group size and party policy positions as independent variables. Finally, Model 5 




Model 1 examines how the probability of rapporteurship membership varies across 
party groups, and the remaining models examine which attributes of these party groups can 
account for this variation. As the categorical party group and the party group attribute 
variables at least partly tap the same characteristics (i.e. the categorical party group variable 
is essentially a multidimensional combination of a large number of party group attributes), 
including them simultaneously in a single model would be problematic and its results 
difficult to interpret.  
In the analysis, we are specifically interested in identifying the effects of party group 
size and party ideology positions on the dependent variable, not in explaining variation in the 
dependent variable as fully as possible. Thus, we only need to include additional variables if 
they are likely confounders for one of the relationships we are focusing on. Both party group 
size and party positions are exogenous to the usual array of explanatory variables used in the 
related literature on the allocation of committee memberships and rapporteurships (Hurka et 
al. 2015; Kaeding 2004; Yoshinaka et al. 2010). In fact, many of these variables, like 
seniority, roll call participation, voting loyalty to the European party group or the national 
party, leadership positions in the EP, in the committee, or in the party group, are likely partly 
a consequence of party group membership, party group size or policy positions of national 
parties. If these variables are indeed partially intervening variables, their inclusion in the 
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analysis is not only unnecessary, but would likely lead to underestimating the coefficients for 
the more remote causes that are of primary interest here (Ray 2003).  
Table 1. Logistic regression of network membership 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept 0.74*** 1.33*** 0.44 1.45*** 1.64*** 
 
(0.27) (0.33) (0.28) (0.24) (0.34) 
GUE/NGL 0.62*     
 
(0.32)     
Greens/EFA 0.58**     
 
(0.29)     
S&D 0.11     
 
(0.21)     
ALDE 0.42*     
 
(0.25)     
EPP -0.18     
 
(0.20)     
EFD -0.80**     
 
(0.33)     
Party group size (log)  -0.18**   -0.16 
 
 (0.08)   (0.15) 
European integration   0.36  0.27 
 
  (0.25)  (0.46) 
Gal/Tan    -1.42*** -1.23*** 
 
   (0.27) (0.39) 
AIC 2577.18 2607.84 2464.83 2428.74 2430.51 
BIC 2724.72 2727.01 2582.78 2546.69 2559.69 
Log Likelihood -1262.59 -1282.92 -1211.41 -1193.37 -1192.25 
Deviance 2525.18 2565.84 2422.83 2386.74 2384.51 
Num. obs. 2153 2153 2032 2032 2032 
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1; the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating membership in 
a committee’s policymaking network; robust standard errors, clustered by MEP, in parentheses; committee 
dummies included as control variables in all models; the baseline category for the committee variable is the 
Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee and the baseline category for the party group variable is the ECR 
group; as baseline categories, we chose categories with membership rates closest to the overall sample 
membership rate 
The results of Model 1 in Table 1 reproduce the patterns in Figure 1. The regression 
coefficients of party groups in Model 1 provide the deviations in effect sizes in reference to 
the party group closest to the sample mean, the ECR. But Models 2 to 5 allow us to determine 
what drives the differences in network membership patterns between party groups. Model 5 
provides support for H3a, in that the coefficient for members’ stance on the Gal/Tan 
dimension is positive and significant. In contrast, the coefficients for support for European 
integration and party group size either show no statistically significant relationship with 
network membership (in the case of EU attitudes, see Models 3 and 5), or that relationship 
loses statistical significance once we control for Gal/Tan (in the case of party group size, 





Figure 2. Predicted probability of network membership 
Notes: The figure displays predicted probabilities for different values of Gal/Tan based on Model 5 in Table 1 
for a member of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, keeping party group size and support for 
European integration constant at their means. The shaded area indicates a 95% confidence interval. 
Figure 2 illustrates the change in the predicted probability of network membership as a result 
of different values of Gal/Tan for a member of the Economic and Monetary Affairs 
Committee, holding support for European integration and party group size constant at their 
mean. A change from the Gal to the Tan end of the dimension is associated with a substantial 
decrease in the probability of network membership of more than 26 percentage points. 
We also relied on our qualitative interview data to investigate in more detail the finding 
that MEPs with more Tan views, especially members of the EFD, have a lower probability of 
being part of the policymaking network. We were particularly interested in whether this 
marginalization of the radical Eurosceptic far right was self-imposed or the result of 
exclusion from the policymaking process by the other groups. Across the board (including 
our two Eurosceptic right-wing respondents), our interviews suggest that it is a lot of the 
former and some of the latter. In general, there is agreement that the far-right only has a 
handful of members who are active and present in legislative affairs and that most of its 
members only rarely seek to influence legislation (#1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11). As one 
respondent puts it: “They just have no intention of playing the game. … All they’re interested 
in is standing up in plenary when all the cameras are on and making populist speeches. It’s 
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not about trying to improve the legislation” (#7). Another respondent states bluntly that “they 
exclude themselves” (#6).  
However, some recognize that the exclusion of the far right may stem at least in part 
from human resource scarcities—not only at the level of MEPs and their offices, but also in 
the secretariats of those political groups (Interview 2)—and the difficulty of assuming 
specific policy positions in political groups that are ideologically incoherent (#2, 8, 9). 
Nonetheless, marginalization is also self-imposed and quite purposeful, as one MEP of the 
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) readily acknowledges when he explains that:  
“As a UKIP MEP I am not fully involved with the law making process … [We] 
make it clear when we stand for election that we will not assist the EU law-
making process. We are the opposition. In practice this means that we are never 
rapporteurs, we do not seek chairmanships of committees and we do not get 
involved in trilogues. We attend committees, we speak in committees, we are 
coordinators in committees where the opportunity arises, as this gives us an 
insight into what is coming up. We will vote in favor of certain amendments on a 
‘least bad' basis, but will almost always vote against the legislative report as a 
whole.” (#5) 
But this is not true for all MEPs of the Eurosceptic right: those who take a constructive 
approach and seek to join the deliberation process can and do engage in policymaking (#4, 9, 
10, 11). And, all else equal, other political groups prefer not to deal with members of the 
Eurosceptic far right, given divergent values and preferences over political outcomes (#3, 4, 
7). While they cannot be barred from official proceedings, including rapporteur-shadow 
meetings in those instances when the far right has chosen to appoint a shadow (#1, 7), it does 
happen that the more mainstream party groups decide to principally engage with each other in 
less formal settings and negotiations (#7, 8, 9, 11). There is, in other words, some sidelining 
of Eurosceptic far-right legislators by other party groups.
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Effect of party group membership on network centrality and potential for brokerage 
Having looked at the determinants of network membership, we now examine variation across 
party groups in the centrality and potential for brokerage of MEPs that form part of the 
policymaking networks. Figure 3 shows the Eigenvector centrality of MEPs from different 
party groups.
16
 The figure seems to suggest that members of the smaller groups indeed tend 
to be more central in the networks, while pro- and anti-Europeans show up as both central 
(Greens/EFA, ALDE vs. GUE, ECR) and not central (S&D, EPP vs. EFD). Finally, there 
may be a relationship between Gal values and network centrality, but the pattern is less clear-




Figure 3. Eigenvector centrality of MEPs, by party group 
Notes: The bar charts show the median, upper and lower quartile (horizontal lines) as well as the mean 
(diamond-shaped point) of the distribution of centrality scores for each party group. The dashed horizontal line 
indicates the mean centrality score across members of all party groups. N = 1494. 
To examine the distribution of centrality and network constraint values across party groups 
more systematically and to identify party group member attributes that are related to these 
differences, we conduct a number of linear regression analyses. But since our dependent 
variables are social network measures, we cannot assume that our observations are 
independent of one another (Cranmer et al. 2017). To address this problem, we rely on a 
node-level regression approach that computes standard Ordinary Least Square estimates of 
the regression coefficients. Probability values for significance tests are then computed by 
randomly permuting the elements of the dependent variable vector and re-computing the 
regression, a step that is repeated a large number of times (10,000 iterations, in our case). 
Tests of statistical significance are then conducted on the basis of these simulations.
17
 We use 
the same specifications of independent variables as above, except that the (again log-
transformed) independent variable ‘party group size’ now refers to the number of party group 
members in the networks, rather than the committee as a whole. The results of the analyses 
are reported in Table 2. 
21 
 
Table 2. Linear regression of network position measures (with permutation tests of statistical significance) 
 Eigenvector centrality Betweenness centrality Network constraint 
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 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.20 0.24 0.22 0.18 0.23 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.44 
Adj. R
2
 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.23 0.21 0.17 0.22 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.43 
Num. obs. 1476 1476 1391 1391 1476 1476 1391 1391 1476 1476 1391 1391 
Notes: 
***
p < 0.01, 
**
p < 0.05, 
*
p < 0.1; the dependent variable is the log-transformed value of the respective network centrality measure; p-values are in 
parentheses; committee dummies included as control variables in all models; the baseline category for the committee variable is the Constitutional Affairs 
Committee and the baseline category for the party group variable is the EFD group; as baseline categories, we chose categories with category mean scores 




Not surprisingly, the ranking of coefficient values of the categorical party group variable in 
Models 1, 5, and 9 correspond closely to the ranking of means of party groups on different 
dependent variables shown in Figure 3 and Figures A4 and A5 in the online appendix. Note 
that these coefficients do not estimate the mean centrality scores for party groups as a 
collective, but the mean centrality scores for their individual members.
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 As expected (H1b 
and H3b), party group size and Gal/Tan position have a statistically significant negative 
effect on Eigenvector centrality and betweenness centrality, and a positive effect on network 
constraint (Models 4, 8, and 12). Support for European integration shows the same pattern of 
relationships in models that do not account for party group size, but controlling for party 
group size demonstrates that these relationships are spurious (compare Models 3 and 4, 7 and 
8, as well as 11 and 12). H2b is thus not confirmed. Regarding substantive effect sizes, 
holding all other variables constant, a one per cent increase in party group size decreases 
Eigenvector centrality by about 0.45 per cent and betweenness centrality by about 0.32 per 
cent. Network constraint is increased by about 0.18 per cent. Moving from the theoretical 
minimum (0) to the maximum (1) of the Gal/Tan scale decreases Eigenvector centrality by 37 
per cent, decreases betweenness centrality by 30 per cent, and increases network constraint 
by 17 per cent.  
The effects of Gal/Tan and party group size on the predicted values of the centrality 
measures and network constraint on their original scales are further illustrated in Figure 4. 
The effect of party group size is generally stronger than the effect of Gal/Tan, and the latter 
varies considerably across different dependent variables. It is weakest in the case of 
Eigenvector centrality and strongest in the case of network constraint. Still, taking the 
difference in predicted values from the minimum to the maximum of the respective variable 
as a yardstick, both effect sizes cover a substantial proportion of the value ranges of the 





Figure 4. Predicted values of network position measures 
Notes: The figure displays predicted values based on Models 4, 8, and 12 in Table 2 for a member of the 
Constitutional Affairs Committee, keeping support for European integration variable constant at its mean and 
varying the Gal/Tan and party group size variables. Confidence intervals are based on t-distribution, not 
simulated distributions. 
The findings that MEPs from small party groups are more central in the policymaking 
networks and connect more colleagues who are not otherwise tied to one another are notable 
from a social networks perspective, because they may have distinct relational and 
informational benefits (e.g., Burt 1992; Krackhardt 1992; Ringe and Victor 2013). Whether 
this proposition holds water in the perceptions of EP insiders was another topic in the 
interviews we conducted, and there was some recognition of relational benefits of being a 
small group. For example, one respondent (#8) from a smaller political group explained that 
he may walk into the second or third meeting of the day having already interacted with the 
representatives of some of the other small groups in earlier meetings, while the person from 
the EPP is “new” to the group. Another respondent agreed that it can matter when you know 
and have worked with people before, especially because MEPs from the large groups may 
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only show up to meetings when “their” files are being dealt with; it can also be an advantage 
to be familiar with an array of different topics (#4).  
But respondents were also quite clear about the costs of having comparatively little 
manpower, which may entail having to do more work less thoroughly (#4, 9). A respondent 
from one of the large groups believes that these realities come at the expense of policy 
expertise, efficiency, and effectiveness, which in her mind clearly outweighs the benefit of 
being more connected (#11). And, in the end, small groups naturally have more difficulty 
filling all necessary shadow slots (#1, 4), and their representatives may be forced to miss 
some meetings when they conflict with responsibilities on another file (#6). 
Conclusion 
Policymaking in legislatures is subject to a substantial degree of specialization and 
delegation, which comes with many practical advantages, including the efficient use of scarce 
resources and the reliance on higher levels of expertise, which may result in better-quality 
policy outcomes. Within a legislature, the formulation of policy is often delegated to different 
committees; within committees, a subset of members is either nominated or self-selects into 
taking the lead on drafting and negotiating particular pieces of legislation. But while 
committees have received significant attention in the study of legislative politics, the 
common practice of delegation of policy leadership within committees has not been the 
subject of much previous research. We thus know little about the subgroups of legislators 
that, in practice, drive policymaking in many legislatures around the world. 
This article examined the composition of these subgroups by studying the membership 
and structural position of MEPs in policymaking networks composed of rapporteurs and 
shadows who are linked through their joint work on legislative proposals in the 7th term of 
the European Parliament (2009-2014). It thus took seriously the relational aspects of politics 
and policymaking that are too often overlooked in legislative studies. Our theoretical focus 
was on whether members of small parties enjoy particular relational advantages that are 
driven, counterintuitively, by a scarcity of human resources: the members of small parties 
have to handle a greater number of legislative proposals than their large party colleagues, 
which leads to the creation of strong, bridging ties in policymaking networks. These kinds of 
ties entail a series of potential benefits in terms of trust, information, and brokerage. We 
investigated empirically if these benefits are realized in EP rapporteur-shadow networks, or if 
the structural constraints associated with small party size and/or particular ideological 
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profiles in fact depress the capacity or willingness of small party lawmakers to realize the 
relational benefits of small numbers. 
With respect to party group size, our results indicate that small party groups are not as 
side-lined in the policymaking process as one might expect from a viewpoint that ignores the 
relational sources of political influence. Smaller party groups surely face important structural 
disadvantages and they have to be able to cover a broader range of policy proposals and may 
therefore be less able to specialize and focus narrowly on only specific policy issues. 
However, our quantitative analyses show that members of smaller groups are just as likely to 
be members of policymaking networks as their colleagues from larger ones, and that they 
even tend to occupy more prominent positions than members of larger ones. The need to 
assign the same actors a greater number of reports thus entails that members of small party 
groups hold potentially advantageous positions in relational (or social network) terms: they 
are more central and connect a greater number of colleagues who are not otherwise tied to 
one another. Again, it is worth noting that this finding is far from trivial, as smaller party 
groups could choose to focus their scarce resources on a small number of reports that are of 
particular interest to them instead of spreading their resources more thinly across a large 
number of reports. But small party groups not only use their minority rights to assume the 
role of the political opposition against their large counterparts (Thierse 2015), they take 
active part in policymaking processes and may use their roles as brokers and transmitters of 
information between other members of the network and across policy proposals in efforts to 
advance their policy objectives. Overall, our interview data suggest that these benefits do not 
outweigh the structural downsides of being small, but they do alleviate them. We should thus 
be careful not to be too dismissive of the role of small parties in legislative decision-making, 
because even perceived weaknesses can turn out to be advantageous. 
With respect to ideological views, we find that members of Gal parties are more 
involved, more central, and they connect more of their colleagues in policymaking networks 
than those of Tan parties. In other words, legislators whose ideological outlook includes a 
commitment to democratic participation drive policymaking in the legislature. In contrast, 
those MEPs who see their role in obstructing policymaking, and who reject certain 
democratic values and processes, choose to stay out of the lawmaking process. In terms of 
EU politics, this means that especially the most Tan party group, the EFD, remains side-lined 
when it comes to policy creation, despite the support its constituent national parties have 
enjoyed in recent elections. And while the EFD is popularly known as Eurosceptic far right 
party, it is the party group’s Tan leanings that differentiate it from the other groups. Indeed, it 
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is quite notable that not all Eurosceptics are marginalized: the “soft” Eurosceptics on left and 
right actively participate in policymaking. In other words, marginalization is a choice, and 
there appears to be a difference between being “anti-system” but devoted to changing the 
system “from within”, and rejecting democratic participation outright in favor of 
obstructionism.  
In terms of scope and generalizability of our findings, there is no apparent reason to 
believe that they are the results of the unique features of the EP or the EU as a whole. Sub-
groups of committee members taking the lead on drafting and negotiating particular policy 
proposals are a regular feature of legislative assemblies and parliaments around the globe, 
and ideology or group size are not confined to the EP context as relevant explanatory 
variables. At the same time, the results of our study are more likely to apply to legislative 
institutions that share some of the core features of the EP as a legislature and the EU as a 
political system. Chief amongst them are the strong powers and elevated positions of 
committees within the legislatures, the separation of power between the legislature and the 
executive, and the existence of a multi-party system. In legislatures with weak committees, 
the locus of policymaking might reside in other arenas. Similarly, two-party systems lack 
small parties, so our results about party size do obviously not apply. However, our results 
about ideology should travel there, as ideological views are an attribute of individual 
legislators, not parties. Finally, unlike in the separation of power system of the EU, in 
parliamentary systems with a strong government-opposition divide in the legislature, the 
effect of party group size might be conditional on whether or not a party belongs to the 
government coalition. Smaller parties in the opposition might be more likely to be 
marginalized than government parties.     
Our empirical findings have important normative implications, as the potential 
relational benefits of small party status and the higher involvement of lawmakers from Gal 
parties speak directly to questions of democratic legitimacy and thus have implications for 
the long-standing and ongoing debate about the EU’s “democratic deficit.” While the 
delegation of policy leadership to a small subset of legislative actors may raise concerns 
about a possible lack of transparency and accountability, and about restrictions on the 
descriptive and effective representation of the variety of views included in the legislature, we 
find EP policymaking to be remarkably inclusive: lawmakers from small parties are not 
systematically sidelined in the legislative process, and the marginalization we do observe is 
largely self-imposed. This is an important observation with regard to the “input legitimacy” 
of policymaking (Scharpf 1999). But being able to participate is not a sufficient criterion for 
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evaluating the legitimacy of democratic decision-making, according to Schmidt (2013). She 
maintains that, to judge if citizens are indeed able to express and pursue their ideas and 
demands through the active participation in policymaking of the representatives they elect, 
one must also consider the “throughput legitimacy” of policymaking by examining the 
collaborative and deliberative interrelationships and interactions among policymakers. 
Investigating legislative politics through a social networks lens enables the 
identification and analysis of informal opportunity structures created and maintained by 
legislators who seek to influence deliberations and negotiations. Here, it is notable indeed 
that small parties may be able to partially counteract the structural disadvantages they face by 
exploiting the relational benefits associated with strong, bridging ties, which may partially 
level a playing field that tends to favor large parties. As a result, it is more likely that even 
small parties with ideological profiles outside the mainstream are able to articulate and 
pursue their policy objectives – as long as they choose to take part in policymaking –, which 
in turn gives voice to those citizens who voted for them. This does not mean that small parties 
and their members necessarily or regularly achieve the policy outcomes they prefer – in fact, 
they most likely do not given majority rule – but they can represent their views, participate, 
and try to influence policymaking. 
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Notes 
 
1.  Previous social networks research has found that it is weak, not strong ties, that tend to be bridging 
(e.g., Friedkin 1980). This is a tendency, however, and strong ties can of course also be bridging.  
2.  We do not directly investigate the impact of strong ties on such outcomes in the case at hand, but the 
idea that strong ties benefit information exchange, knowledge transfer, learning, and innovation has 
found support in an extensive body of multidisciplinary research (e.g., Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 
1997; Centola and Macy 2007; Fleming et al. 2007; Granovetter 2005; Morgan and Sorensen 1999).  
3.  Indeed, the results of our analysis below actually reject one of these expectations. 
4.  Tables A4 and A6 to A8 replicate these regression analyses but include a left-right ideology variable. 
Table A3 presents pairwise correlations of the three party position variables. 
5.  The relevant information was downloaded from the EP website on 21 July 2015 using a Python script. 
See appendix for more information. 
6.  See Table A1 in the online appendix for a breakdown by type of parliamentary procedure.  
7.  Tables A5 and A9 replicate the following analyses but control for type of committee membership (i.e. 
substitute or full). 
8.  There is variation across committees in the number of committee members and their involvement as 
rapporteurs and shadows (see Table A2 in the online appendix for more details). We therefore 
include fixed effects for committee. Note that some committee members are not part of our networks 
because they served as rapporteurs but were not shadowed by anybody else. 
9.  Non-aligned members are included as a separate category in the descriptive graphs but not in the 
regression analyses. Since these MEPs are not members of a party group, no meaningful value for the 
party group size variable, which is the other main explanatory variable in the regression models, can 
be assigned to them. 
10.  Our discussion focuses on the EPP and the S&D because for these party groups, the interview 
statements provide a clear yardstick for probing the nature and extend of potential underreporting: 
they suggest that shadows were provided in all cases (i.e. 100%). Respondents from other party 
groups acknowledge that their shadow rapporteurship rate is lower than 100% but do not provide a 
precise quantitative figure to which we could compare to our data. Our findings regarding the effect 
of party group size on network centrality could in principle be driven by differential underreporting 
amongst smaller and larger party groups; from a data-generation point of view, however, there is 
little reason to expect such differences in reporting, and our interview evidence does not suggest 
them either.    
11.  This figure of 3.5% concerns discrepancies that are unexplained. The remaining differences between 
the two data sources concern shadow rapporteurships for opinions, which are not recorded in the 
Legislative Observatory. Given our focus on social ties between legislators, it is important not to 





12.  While centrality measures may be sensitive to random measurement error, existing research 
(Borgatti et al. 2006) suggests that random error below 10% is largely inconsequential.   
13.  Plots of the distribution of size and ideology scores by party group are provided in the online 
appendix. 
14.  Results for models including only particular independent variables and further possible combinations 
thereof are reported as robustness checks in the online appendix. 
15.  Some of our interviews suggest that mainstream parties may be more actively excluding the 
Eurosceptic far right during the current 2014-19 term than they did before (#6, 8, 11). 
16.  Figures showing equivalent patterns for betweenness centrality and network constraint are in the 
online appendix. Given the strongly left-skewed distributions of all three variables, we take their 
natural logarithm as dependent variables in the regression analyses. By default, the centrality and 
brokerage measures are normalized to range between 0 and 1. Before taking the natural logarithm, 
we rescaled the variables to range from 0 to 100. As the logarithm of 0 is undefined, we added 1 to all 
values before transforming the variable. 
17.  Note that regression procedures in UCINET (Borgatti et al. 2002) only provide significance levels and 
p-values, not standard errors. This is reflected in Table 2. 
18.  Readers might wonder why the mean centrality and brokerage scores of EFD members are higher 
than of members of the two larger party groups. This finding can be explained by the fact that the 
effect of party group size outweighs the effect of ideology (see Figure 4 below); it does not imply that 
larger party groups as a collective are less central in the network. Our analysis focuses on the 
centrality of individual MEPs; it does not address the question of how central entire party groups are. 
 
 
